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Contingent Prices and Money· 
(Shortened title: Contingent Prices) 
BY RICHARD DUTU, ST ELLA HUANGFU, AND BENOIT JULIEN' 
Deakin University; University of Sydney; University of New South Wales 
P rice posting with directed search is a widely-used trading mechanism. Coles and Eeckhout 
(2003) showed. that if sellers are allowed. to post prices contingent on realized demand instead 
of one price, then there is real market indeterminacy. In this paper we fit this contingent price 
posting protocol into a. monetary economy. We show that, as long as holding money is costly, 
there exists a unique equilibrium rather than a continuum. In this equilibrium sellers post a 
low price for when the buyer is alone, a high price fo r when several buyers show up, and buyers 
randomize between sellers and money holdings. 
1 Introduction 
Price posting with directed search is a pricing mechanism in which sellers advertise terms of 
trade, buyers observe those terms of trade and decide which seller to visit. While originally 
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developed in the context of the goods market (e.g. Butters, 1977; Peters, 1984), it was popular-
ized by several influential studies of the job market (e.g. Montgomery, 1991; Moen, 1997) where 
it fits nicely: employers advertise wages, workers observe wages and decide where to apply. 
The central friction in this pricing protocol is the ex ante probability that both buyers 
and sellers can be rationed. If two or more buyers show up at the same seller, one buyer 
will leave the market empty handed. If no buyer shows up at one seller, the seller will leave 
empty handed. Given those contingencies, a key aspect of directed search is the conunitment 
by sellers to not act opportunistically ex post. In particular, one may wonder why sellers do 
not advertise auctions instead of fixed prices in order to take advantage of possible oompetition 
among buyers. Such criticism has raised doubts about the opportunity to use price posting 
with directed search, arguing that it does not describe equilibrium behavior. 
Coles and Eeckhout (2003) proposed the following answer. They build a model of directed 
search in which sellers, rather than advertising a fixed price, are allowed to post prices contingent 
on realized demand. For instance a seller might advertise a higher price should more than 
one buyer desire the good. Specifically, each seller posts a price pair (P1.P2) where VI is the 
(pairwise) price charged if only one buyer shows up (who gets the good with certainty), while 
P2 is the (multilateral) price charged if two or more buyers visit (and the good is then randomly 
allocated to one of the buyers). T hey show that in equilibrium sellers post a unique price for 
when only one buyer arrives (the pairwise price vd, but the price that applies if both buyers 
visit (the multilateral price 112) can be anywhere between the seller 's reservation value and the 
buyer's reservation value: there is real market indeterminacy. It follows that posting a fixed 
price or an auction both describe equilibrium behavior, This indeterminacy result is often used 
to support the use of price posting with directed search as a trading mechanism (e.g. Rogerson, 
Shimer and Wright, 2005). 
Our goal in this paper is to study how robust Coles and Eeckhout (2003)'6 robustness test 
is, In particular buyers and sellers do not trade in a nominal vacuum. Sellers advertise nominal 
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prices and accordingly buyers bring money to pay for the goods. One suspects that monetary 
factors, especially the cost of using money, may limit the range of possibilities for sellers in 
their pricing decisions. Our strategy is then the following. Assume that sellers post contingent 
prices. In addition to which seller they should visit, buyers must now choose how much money 
to bring to the seller. As in Coles and Eeckhout (2003), buy.ers will weigh the price pairs against 
the probability to trade. But now, buyers will also have to weigh the return on bringing more 
money (which allows them to t rade in multilateral meetings) against the cost of holding that 
extra money (the foregone interests for instance). Basically, we are asking sellers to endogenize 
buyers' budget constraint while deciding upon prices. 
Our result comes in sharp contrast to Coles and Eeckhout (2003): if money holdings are 
costly for buyers, then rather than a continuum of equilibria there exists a unique equilibrium 
in contingent prices. In this equilibrium sellers post a low price for when the buyer is alone, a 
high price fo r when several buyers show up, and buyers randomize between sellers and money 
holdings. This result implies that posting an auction or posting a fixed.' price are no longer dif-
ferent equilibria of a more general contingent-price posting mechanism. In a monetary economy. 
when using money is costly. there is just one price pair that enables sellers to price discriminate 
on the basis of realized demand. Put it another way, money (or should we say costly money) 
destroys the mapping from contingent prices into auctions and fixed-price posting. 
The intuition behind this result comes from the internalization by sellers of buyers' liquidity 
constraints. In the non-monetary version, advertising more buyer surplus in some states and 
offering less in others, that is posting 1'2 =F Pl, can leave expected buyer and seller surplus 
unchanged. Those changes, however, change the demand elasticities of buyers and therefore 
the best-response correspondence of competing sellers, hence the continuum of equilibria. In 
such non-monetary economy buyers are assumed to be able to hold any amount of money for 
free SO that monetary strategies are irrelevant. But if money is costly, because of inflation 
for instance, buyers weigh the cost of holding more money against the augmented trading 
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opportunities that it offers. For a given nominal interest rate, holding 1'2 in monetary units 
will be preferred to holding PI if P2 is only slightly greater than Pi since the marginal cost is 
small compared to the additional trading opportunities. But a buyer will be better off holding 
PI in monetary units if 1'2 is significantly greater than PI since the marginal cost more than 
cancels the marginal benefit. Because buyer's expected net surplus decreases monotonically as 
1>2 rises above Pb there exists only one multilateral price 1'2 within the former continuum t hat 
leaves buyers indifferent between holding 1>2 or PI- As a result, sellers post a low price for when 
the buyer is alone, a high price for when several buyers show UP. buyers randomize between 
sellers and money holdings, producing unique non-degenerate distributions of money holdings 
and prices. 
We believe this result is important because it should change the way we think of directed 
search with price posting. The standard assumption in directed search models that sellers 
commit to a single, non-contingent price is often defended by Coles and Eeckhout's result tha.t 
this behavior is an equilibrium. Our paper suggests that this result is not robust: given a 
small perturbation in the environment, the indeterminacy vanishes and 8. unique equilibrium 
emerges.2 
In a second part of the paper we investigate the impact of changing the cost of liquidity on 
the equilibrium terms of trade by changing the growth rate of the money supply, resulting in 
1Green and Zhou (1998) also examine indeterminacy in search-based monetary models. They show that 
in a large economy with price posting and random matching there exists a continuum of distinct, stationary, 
single-price monetary equilibri&. Related works in the line of this paper include Zhou (1999, 2000), Kamiya and 
Sat.o (2004), Karoiya, Morishita and Shimizu (2005), Karoiya IUld Shimizu (2006, 2OO7a, 2007b). Recently, Jean, 
Rabinovich and Wright (2010) studied the multiplicity of monetary equilibria and show that introducing a round 
of centralized t rading into Green and Zhou (1998), as in Lagos and Wright (2005), preserves the indeterminacy 
while the resulting model is easier to manipulate and understlUld. Also, Geromichal08 (2010) extends Coles and 
Eec.:khout (2003) by allowing sellers to choose price schedules contingent on ex poot realized demand. He shows 
that indeterminacy of equilibria arises in small markets but vanishes as the number of tradefS in the market 
approaches infinity. 
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shifts in anticipated inflat ion a nd then the nominal interest rate. We first show that uniqueness 
of equilibrium holds for the entire range of nominal interest rates compatible with existence of a 
monetary equilibrium (above a certain threshold buyers simply discard money). In particular, 
one may have expected the indeterminacy to come back at low nominal interest rates as the 
low cost of holding money could make it profitable for buyers to always hold the high amount 
of money. It turns out sellers extract this low cost of liquidity by charging buyers a multilateral 
price that approaches the buyer's reservation value as the nominal interest rate approaches zero, 
thereby supporting uniqueness. Second, we show that for small deviations from the Friedman 
rule, sellers increase the pairwise price they charge in real terms, forcing buyers who pick the 
low money holding to bring more money. As inflation rises it becomes proportionally more 
costly to hold the large amount of money. Sellers extract this incentive to shift to the low 
amount of money by raising the pairwise price. As a result price dispersion-measured by 
the distance between t he pairwise price and the multilateral price--falls as inflation increases. 
While most studies find that price dispersion increases with inflation, some have documented 
falling dispersion, e.g. R.einsdorf (1994). Our paper provides theoretical backing to such finding. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the players, stages, strategies and 
payoffs. Section 3 characterizes the unique symmetric equilibrium. Section 4 examines how 
inflation influences strategic price post ing by sellers. Section 5 concludes. 
2 The model 
2.1 P layers and Strategies 
T here are two sellers indexed by y E {1, 2} and two buyers indexed by x E {I, 2} .3 As in Lagos 
and Wright (2005), they all meet first in a Wal rasian market where they can produce, trade and 
30ur results generali'lle to an "-buyer, n-seller economy. A 2-by-2 economy highlights the interdependence 
between strategies and facilitates comparison with Coles and Eeekhout (2003). We study the "-buyer, n-seller 
eeonomy in Appendix A.4 and contrast the allocation with that of a 2-by-2 economy in section 4. 
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consume any quantity of a first good called the general good. Then they enter a second market 
in which each seller is endowed with one indivisible unit of a second good, called the search 
goOO, that buyers with identical preferences wish to buy. We call the first market the centralized 
Walrasian market (CWM) and the second market the directed search market (DSM). Agents 
discount at rate (3 between the CWM and the DSM but not between periods. 
The sequence of events is as follows. First, the CWM opens and buyers receive a lump sum 
money injection from the central bank, which is common knowledge. Then sellers simultane-
ously and publicly advertise terms of trade contingent on realized demand for the coming DSM. 
The terms of trade consist of one unit of the search good and a price schedule: Pi is the price 
posted by seller 2 that applies in case only one buyer shows up (pairwise match), and 1'2 is the 
price posted by seller 2 that applies if both buyers show up (multilateral match), respectively 
Pi and ~ for seller 1. After observing all the price offers, the two buyers simultaneously choose 
both which seller to visit and how much money to carry to the coming DSM. Money is acquired 
by producing and selling some general good in exchange for money on the CWM. Finally, the 
CWM closes and the DSM opens, where buyers visit the seller of their choosing. If a buyer is 
alone he pays the pairwise price and consumes the good. If the two buyers visit the same seller 
and both can afford the multilateral price, one buyer is chosen raI}domly, pays the multilateral 
price and consumes the good. If only one buyer can afford the multilateral price then he wins 
the good for sure and pays the multilateral price. If none of the buyers can afford to pay the 
high price, no trade takes place. The sequence of events is represented on Figure 1.4 
4Note that if none of the buyers holds the multilateral price, then a seller can actually bf, made worse off if 
two buyers visit than if only one buyer visits since none is able to pay. This peculiu feature or the model is a by-
product of casting the contingent-price economy into a monetary environment. It does not drive our uniquene56 
result, however. As will be clear, it is the ex 8.Ilte indifference condition between money holdings internalized 
by sellers that brings uniqueness of equilibrium. In a similar environment in which sellers poIit auctions instead 
of contingent prices, GaienianOli and Kircher (2008) show that the equilibrium is unique as well, with unique 
distributions of prices and money holdings as in here. 
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2.2 Money 
buyers decide 
which seller 
to visit 
buyers meet sellers 
and trade 
- -- . ,.-----------.--------~ .. ---
Centralized market 
t 
seller 1 posts (p' "p',) 
seller 2 posts (p"P2) buyers decide 
how much 
money to carry 
Frictional market 
Figure 1: Time line. 
To create a role for money in this economy, we make three assumptions. First, as in Rocheteau 
and Wright (2005), we assume that buyers cannot produce in the DSM so that they cannot 
compensate sellers on the spot by producing in exchange for the search good. Second , we 
assume that both goods perish at the end of their subperiod and therefore cannot be used as 
commodity money. Finally, the cost of setting up a public record~keeping system is extremely 
high, implying that each agent's trading history is private information. These assumptions 
make money essential for t rade on the DSM (Kocherlakota, 1998; Wallace, 2001).5 
To produce the general good in the CWM buyers and sellers can exert effort h to produce 
h units of that good. We assume linearity in effort on the CWM as it erases the influence of 
trading histories on money demand (see Lagos and Wright, 2005). Typically, buyers use the 
$Keeping track of each other trading history is probably not that difficult in a 2-by-2 economy and ourlast 
assumption may sound extreme in that regard. Correlated equilibria can also be an issue in a small economy 
like ours since buyers may infer from the equilibrium price of money other buyers' choices of money holding. 
Our interest in fOCUSSing on the small economy is expoeitional as it enables to spell out the interdependence in 
agents'strategies. See Appendix A.4 for details on the large economy where such assumptions 8.l'e natural. 
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CWM to replenish their money holdings by selling some of their general good output to sellers. 
Symmetrically, because sellers do not need. money in the DSM, they use the CWM to spend 
any balances accumulated in the previous DSM. 
The price of money in terms of the general good on the CWM is denoted 1/1, that is 1 unit 
of money buys ¢ units of the general good. It adjusts every period to equate supply of money 
from sellers M S to demand of money coming from buyers MD. The quantity of money grows 
at rate T via lump sum transfers to buyers by the central bank at the beginning of each CWM. 
Inflation (noted :71) is perfectly forecasted. Therefore, if the money supply increases at rate 
'T , so do prices and 1f = T. Since fJ = 1/(1 + r) the Fisher equation (1 + i) = (1 + r)(1 + 7r) 
enables to write the nominal interest rate as i = (1 - f3 + 'T) /f3. Finally, we assume that money 
holdings are buyers' private information. 
2.3 The Payoffs 
If a buyer pays p for the search good in the DSM, he consumes it immediately, which provide'3 
him with utili ty Q. The seller's utility for consuming her endowed search good in this market is 
normalized to zero. In the CWM we denote X consumption of the general good and V(X) the 
corresponding utili ty with V' > 0 and U" < O. The instantaneous utility function for a buyer 
is then given by 
(1) U(X) -h+PQ. 
Since sellers are endowed with the search good, their instantaneous utility function is simply 
(2) U(X) - h. 
Because decisions are related through time via the choice of money holdings, the model is 
one of dynamic optimization. We will focus on stationary allocations, however, where aggregate 
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real variables are constant, including the aggregate real money supply. This implies 4>t+lMt+l = 
4>tMt = (1 + r)¢t+lMt and therefore 4>t+l = ¢d{l + r). From now on we will suppress time 
subscripts and use the subscript + 1 to denote the value of a variable in the next period. 
Let VI>:1:(m) be the value function for buyer x holding m units of money when entering the 
DSM and WI>:1:(m) the value function when entering the CWM. We have 
(3) 
(4) 
Wb«m) ~ max {U(X) - h + PV"'(m)} 
X,h,m 
s.t. q,m+ X ~ h+.(m+T). 
A buyer chooses how much of the general good to consume, X, how much effort to exert, 
h, and how much money to bring to the DSM, m. The budget constraint equalizes resources, 
h+ 4> (m + T) , to demand, ¢m. + X, where T is how many units of money per buyer are injected 
by the central bank at the beginning of the CWM. Substituting for h, the program for a buyer 
in the CWM can be rewritten 
(5) W"'(m) ~ U(X') - X' + • (m + T) + m~ { -q,m + PV"'(m)} , 
where X· is such that U'(X·) = 1. 
Since sellers have no reason to carry money into the DSM and only buyers receive a lump 
sum money transfer, the program for seller 2 is 
(6) 
(7) 
max (U(X) - h + PV" } 
X,h,PI,P2 
s.t. X = h+¢m. 
Seller 2's problem is to choose consumption in the Walrasian market X , effort h and a pair of 
9 
prices (PI ,1>'2) for the DSM. Substituting for h this implies 
(8) W"(m) ~ U(X') - X' +,pm + max,BV·'. 
'" ,,,, 
A similar exercise yields 
(9) 
for seller L 
3 The Equilibrium 
We define a monetary strategy as the probability with which a buyer chooses to carry a particular 
amount of money. Notice that since each seller advertises only two prices, WJ,~) for seller 1 
and (PI, 1>2) for seller 2, if a buyer decides to visit seller 1 for instance, then bringing an amount 
of money equal to either PI or 112 strictly dominates bringing any other a mount. To see this 
assume buyer 1 visits seller 1 and brings PI. If he is alone, either PI > ~ in which case he 
brought too much money, or PI < PI in which case he did not bring enough. The same is true 
if the other buyer is there: either PI > ~ in which case he brought too much money or PI < ~ 
in which case he did not bring enough. As a result , given there can be four prices at most and 
idle balances are costly as soon as i > 0, money holdings can take four values: PJ,P2,~ or 14. 
Correspondingly, we define 8'", as the probability with which buyer x E {I, 2} chooses to hold 
PI given that he has decided to visit seller 1. T hen I -~ is t he probability that buyer x chooses 
to hold 1'2 given that he has decided to visit seller L Similarly, 9", denotes the probability that 
buyer x chooses to hold PI given that he visits seller 2 and 1 - 9", the probability that buyer x 
chooses to hold 1>'2 given that he visits seller 2. 
We define a visit strategy for buyer x as the probability with which a buyer chooses to visit 
a particular seller. We denote by 0'", the probability that buyer x E {I , 2} chooses to visit seller 
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L With probability 1 - U% he chooses to visit seller 2. 
Finally, we define a pricing strategy for seller I as posting a price pair (PI ,1'2), and a pricing 
strategy for seller 2 as posting a price pair (Pt.P2). We restrict our attention to sellers using 
pure pricing strategies and strictly positive prices. 
The resulting game is a two-stage dynamic game of complete but imperfect information due 
to the simultaneity of moves for sellers and for buyers. The equilibrium is subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium. First, taking prices and visit strategies as given, we characterize buyers' 
best response in terms of money holdings. Second , given the equilibrium monetary strategies 
and the prices posted by sellers, we solve for the equilibrium visit strategies. Finally, given 
the equilibrium visit and monetary strategies, we solve fo r the Nash equilibrium in the price 
posting game between the two sellers. As for the price of money on the CWM, ¢, it equalizes 
money supply and money demand consistent with equilibrium strategies. 
D efinition 1 A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is (llist of prices (P\'P'.1,P~,V2) and aliat of 
visit and monetary stmtegiea (UI,U2,O'"O'2,OI ,B2) such that: 
1. Best response by buyers: given (Pl,P2,VI ,14) , (1",,0'% and B:r: deacrWe the Nash equilibrium 
in visit and monetary strategies for each buyer Xi 
2. Best response by sellers: given the subgame visit and monetary strategies (1"" 9'% and B:r:, 
(Pl,P2) and (p'1,14) describe a Nash equilibrium in pricing strategies for the two sellers; 
9. Individual rationality: -¢pj + ,BVn{pj) ~ ,BW""'(O) and - W; + ,BV""'(pj) ~ ,BWb:r:(O}, 
VjE{ I ,2},VxE{I,2}; 
4. Money market clearing and s tationarity: MD = M S and 1>+1 = 1>/(1 +7) . 
The inequalities in point 3 of the definition guarantee that buyers' expected return from 
holding money through the frictional market is no smaller than proceeding directly to the 
centraJized market with no money. Note that there also exists a non-monetary equilibrium in 
which money is not valued and no economic activity takes place in the DSM. We will focus on 
the monetary equilibria in which money has a positive price, that is ¢ > O. 
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Since our focus is on uniqueness of symmetric equilibrium, we concentrate on buyers playing 
the same strategies (no coordination). We also impose - i¢+lPt + Q - ¢+1Pr. ~ - i¢+lP2 + (Q-
¢+1'P2)/ 2 and -i¢+lPl + Q - ¢+lPI 2: -i¢+l~ + (Q - ¢+1r4)/ 2 (buyers would rather be alone 
at either seller) ruling out I1x = 0,1.6 We also concentrate one the case where P2 > Pl. It is 
easy to show that no equilibrium exists when P2 < PI as soon as i > O. 
3 .1 Monetary s t["ategies 
Consider buyer 1 's choice, taking as given both the prices posted by sellers and buyer 2's visit 
and monetary strategies. If he visits seller 1 who posts (]4,r4) holding a money level of PI' 
buyer l's payoff is -¢Pi + ,BVbl(pD with 
(10) 
Equation (10) says that if buyer 1 is alone, which happens wit h probability 1- 112, he purchases 
the good , enjoys utility Q and proceeds to the centralized market with no money. If he is not 
alone, he cannot purchase the good since he does not have enough money. 
Holding P2 his payoff is -~ + .BVbl (14) with 
With probability 112 buyer 1 is not alone, in which case he purchases and consumes the good 
if buyer 2 holds the low amount of money, which happens with probability ~, or if buyer 2 
elf u .. _ 0, then (J .. _ 0 since it is a dominant strategy to bring the high amount of money. While (u .. ,O.,) = 
(O,O) it! an equilibrium of the seeond-stagi! game, as is (0'", If.,) = (1,0), it is not subgame perfect since it is not a 
seller's best response to let the two buyers visit his competitor. These two conditions are always satisfied when 
1>1 > PI, which will be true in equilibrium. 
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holds the high amount of money yet buyer 1 wins the draw, which happens with probability 
(1 - 92)/2. If buyer 1 is alone, which happens with probability 1 - (12, he consumes the good 
but pays only p~. Finally, with probability (12(1 - 92)/2 buyer 2 is there too holding the high 
amount oC money, but buyer 1 does not win the draw and t hen proceeds to the centralized 
market with the same amount of money as when he entered the DSM. 
Lemma 1 If a symmetric equilibrium exists, then buyers rnndomizc over their money holdings. 
Proof. See Appendix. _ 
Taking as given the visit and money decisions of his competitor, a buyer's best response 
upon visiting a seller is to take the low amount of money if he anticipates that the other buyer 
takes t he high amount oC money and vice versa. Both equilibria require coordination, however. 
The only other Nash equilibrium is for both buyers to randomize over their money holding. 
3.2 Visit strategies 
Lemma 2 If a symmetric equilibrium exists, then buyers rnndomize over sellers with probability 
(1 where 
(12) 
Proof. See Appendix. _ 
When deciding which seller to visit, a buyer internalizes the other buyer's indifference be-
tween the low and the high money holding (Lemma 1). This has two effects. First, neither P2 
nor ~ appear as an argument for (1. And second, a buyer's best response depends on the other 
buyer's visit strategy but it does not depend on how much money the other buyer has decided 
to bring, see equations (30) and (31) in the Appendix. Consequently, taking as given the visit 
and money holding decisions of his competitor, the only uncoordinated best--response for both 
buyers is to randomize between sellers. As Cor the opportunity cost of money (measured by 
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i), it can be seen from (12) that it influences buyers' visit strategy only if sellers post different 
price pairs. Should they post identical price pairs, then 0' == 1/2. 
Combining Lemmas 1 and 2, we have a last lemma. 
Lemma 3 Let us note j' and j two lower bounds on the nominal interest rote, and i' and r two 
upper bounds. Given PI < 112 , PI < P2 and (J defined by (12), buyers rondomize over money 
holdings with probabilities: 
(13) 
(14) 
9', = 9',=9'= 
81 = 82 = 8 = 
if i E 11', tJ, 
ifi E Ii,~, 
where; = a (Q - ¢+,P2) 112¢+lU>2 - p,)),;' = a (Q - ¢+lJ>!,) 112¢+l(p!, - p,)), • = 2; and 
'(=2J. 
The proof is straightforward. Inserting 0'1 = 0'2 = (J from Lemma 2 into the expressions 
for buyers' monetary strategies in (24) and (25) and into (26) and (27) in the Appendix yields 
0;. = 0'2 = (j and 81 = 82 = 8 as in (13) and (14). 
From Lemma 1 buyers randomize over how much money they bring to the seller they are 
visiting. Given the expressions for 9' and 8 in (13) and (14) this imposes bounds on the value 
of the nominal interest rate, i.e. i E [i',t] and i E [i,r] respectively. As a matter of fact, for 
low enough i for instance, we would have 8 < 0 and f1 < 0, suggesting that buyers always 
opt for the high money holding, destroying the equilibrium in contingent prices. Note that 
those bounds are endogenous, however, and they turn out to adjust to shifts in i in a way that 
ensures i stays within the intervals [i', 'i'J and li. iJ that support the mixed monetary strategies 
(see Proof of Proposition I). Finally, note that symmetric price posting by sellers CPt = PI and 
~ = P2) would imply (j = 0, i = i' and r = i' in addition to (J = 1/2. 
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3.3 Pricing strategies 
Now, using the equilibrium strategy profile (0" ,8' ,8) of the second-stage game for given (P1.P2) 
and (Pi,~) , we derive sellers' best responses. Seller l's value function upon entering the DSM 
is given by 
(15) V" ~ 2a(1 - a) W ;\ (p',) + a' [I - (0')'] w~\ (p,) + [a' (8')' + (I - u)'] W; \ (0). 
Equation (15) says that if buyer 1 is the only buyer, which happens with probability 0" (1 - 0") . 
or if buyer 2 is the only buyer, which also happens with probability 0" (1 - 0"). then seller 1 
proceeds to the CWM with Pi. If both buyers are present and at least one of them holds the 
high amount of money, which happens with probability 0"2 [1 - (8')2J , then seller 1 enters the 
next CWM with p;. In all other circumstances no sale takes place. Similarly, for seller 2 we 
have 
(16) V" ~ 2a (I - a ) w;l (p,) + (I - u)' (I - 0') w;l (]>, ) + [(1 - a)' 0' + a'] W;l (0). 
Using the linearity of the W function and getting rid of the constant W.::f (0) terms, the two 
value functions simplify into the following expressions 
(17) 
(18) 
fl' ~ 2a (I - a) ¢+,P; + a' [I - (8')'] ¢+,p, 
II' ~ 2a (I - a) ¢+,p, + (I - a)' (I - 0') ¢ +,/>2 
which we call sellers' profits. 
We are now in a position to characterize t he equilibrium. As indicated, we focus on t he 
symmetric price posting equilibrium as is natural when the economy becomes large. Note 
however that symmetry in visit (0"1 = 0"2 = 0") and monetary strategies (~ = 8'2 = 8' and 
81 = 82 = 8 ) were found to be the unique uncoordinated equilibrium of the second-stage game 
without assuming symmetric price posting. 
Proposition 1 Denote i. an upper bound on the nominal interest rate. For i E (0, i.], there 
exists a unique symmetric subgame Nash equilibrium where each seller posts pi > pi, and in 
the resulting subgame each buyer visits either seller with probability 17* = 1/2 and chooses to 
hold the low amount of money with probability 6- = fY* = 4i¢+1 (pi - pi) / (Q - ¢+lP2) - l. 
For i = ° there exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria indexed by a E (0, QJ in which each 
seller charges pi = Q/ 2 in pairwise meetings and 112 = Q' in multilateral meetings (cf Coles and 
Eeckhout f003). For i > i. there is no monetary equilibrium 
Proof. See Appendix. _ 
The continuum of symmetric equilibria in Coles and Eeckhout (2003) is characterized by 
sellers posting PI = Q/2 and 1'2 = Q' E (0, QJ in their 2x 2 game. In the monetary version of their 
economy, when deciding upon prices, sellers must now internalize buyers' ex ante indifference 
condition between the low and the high money holding. For instance, when the nominal interest 
rate i is close to zero, then sellers will still post a pairwise price PI ~ Q/ 2 as in Coles and 
Eeckhout (2003). But there is now a unique multilateral price within the former continuum 
that makes holding PI in monetary units equivalent to holding 1'2 once the opportunity costs 
of holding PI and holding P2 are taken into account. This additional constraint destroys the 
degree of freedom in choosing two prices that sellers had in the non-mone~ary version of the 
model. The indeterminacy found in directed search with contingent prices does not hold once 
buyers trade using costly mon~y. At the Friedman rule, however, since holding money is free, 
a (weakly) dominant strategy is to hold P2 and we are back to a dynamic version of Coles and 
Eeckhout's economy: there exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria indexed by Q E (0, QJ in 
which each seller charges PI = Q/2 in pairwise meetings and P2 = a in multilateral meetings. 
One way to understand this result is to look at Figure 2. In the non-monetary version of 
this model buyers are assumed to be able to pay any posted price SO that monetary strategies 
are irrelevant. For a given Pl, when money is costly, holding 1>2 will be preferred to holding 
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net payoffs 
-$p,+~V(p,) 
1-___ ___ """"'~----$=p,+~V(P,) 
~----------~-------+-+P2 p, Q 
Figure 2: Uniqueness. 
PI if 1'2 is only slightly greater than P1 (the marginal cost is small compared to the additional 
trading opportunities). By contrast a buyer is clearly better off holding PI if P2 is significantly 
greater than PI (the marginal cost more than cancels the marginal benefit). Since the value of 
holding P2 decreases linearly with 1'2 there exists only one multilateral price that makes a buyer 
indifferent between holding the low or the high amount of money. Although Fig. 2 takes PI as 
given, note that it is the pair (Pl,P2) that is uniquely determined in equilibrium. 
This result is important. The standard assumption in directed search models that sellers 
commit to a single, non-contingent price is often defended by Coles and Eeckhout's result that 
this behavior is an equilibrium. Our paper suggests that this result is not robust: if agents 
trade using money, unless the central bank runs the Friedman ru le, the indeterminacy vanishes 
and a unique price-posting scheme emerges with the property that Pl t 112. Models with money 
have t hen different implications than models without money. In the next section we explore 
further the impact of liquidity costs on strat.egic price posting decisions by sellers.7 
1Note that profit is higher when sellers post contingent prices than when ~hey post a fixed price, regardless 
of the nominal interest rate. From Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001 ). profit in the symmetric equilibrium of an 
economy in which sellers post a single price is I. In our model, when i ..... 0, profit is ! > I. It is easy to show 
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Timing is important for our result. So far we have assumed that sellers post prices first 
and then buyers select a seller and a money holding simultaneously. Assume now that sellers 
post prices after buyers have chosen a money holding and a seller. First, note that buyers are 
now ignorant of prices when deciding upon a seller to visit. This has two consequences: buyers 
randomize between sellers so that the model becomes one of random matching and posting; 
and sellers no longer compete against each other by way of prices since buyers are already 
committed to visiting a seller. As a result, the seller is able to extract maximum surplus by 
posting the monopoly price, as in Diamond (1971) . This monopoly price takes into account 
the cost of holding money for the buyer, i.e. each seller posts a unique monopoly price Pm 
given by -i~+lPm + (1 - (1 + (1/2) [Q - ~+IPm] = O. Buyers anticipate the monopoly price and 
carry Pm. Uniqueness is then robust to a change in timing, but the contingent price posting 
equilibrium unravels as sellers are now posting a unique price.8 
4 Inflation and Strategic Price Posting 
In this section we examine how shifts in the inBation rate impact on the price pair posted by 
sellers and the distribution of money holdings. Recall from the proof of Proposition 1 that in 
that this inequality holds for all i E (O,i~J. 
8This last result is reminiscent of a result in Jean, Rabinovich andWright's (2010) model of random matching 
and poeting. There are a couple of differences, however. First, sellers are allowed to post coDtingent prices here, 
and second, Jean et &I. (2010) examine two different timing assumptions; either buyers and sellers move at the 
same time, in which case there ill a continuum of prices, or sellers move first in which case there is a unique 
equilibrium where sellers post the monopoly price. The version of our model in which sellers post last is simply 
a version of their model in which buyers move first and sellers are allowed to post contingent prices, yet they end 
up posting a unique price since they have no use of a multilateral price. 
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the symmetric equilibrium real prices are given by: 
(19) ~ ~ Q (I +8) [2i - 9 (1+ 6i) - 9'] ¢p, ~ 2;[1 + 29 + 8i9 + 9'] 
(20) ¢p', Q(I _ 9') ~ m ~ I +9(2+8i+9) 
As an example, setting Q = 1 and i = 0.1 yields rPPl = 0.518 and rPP2 = 0.867 and 0' = 0.052. 
As for the individual rationality constraints in Definition 1, they transform into i < i# with 
i# ::::: 63%. Figure 3 represents the equilibrium real values of PI and 1'2 as the nominal interest 
rate increases away from the Friedman rule. The blue lines represent the price pair in the 2--by.2 
game while the red lines represent the price pair in the n·by·n game.9 
First, one may have expected the indeterminacy to survive for low values of the nominal 
interest rate. As the opportunity cost of holding money becomes small, holding even the high 
amount of money does not cost much yet it allows to trade in multilateral matches. Actually, 
. sellers take advantage of buyers' greater incentive to hold large amounts of money by charging 
a real price ~ that gets closer to Q (the buyer's reservation value) as the nominal interest 
rate approaches zero. Because of this high price in multilateral meetings, buyers still have an 
incentive to carry the low amount of money despite the low opportunity cost of money. 
Second, it turns out that for small deviations from the Friedman rule sellers actually increase 
the pairwise price they charge in real terms, forcing buyers who pick the low money holding to 
bring more money. As inflation rises it becomes proportionally more costly to hold the large 
amount of money. Sellers extract this incentive for buyers to shift to the low money holding 
by raising the price they charge in pairwise meetings. That is, higher inflation allows sellers to 
raise the real price they charge in the unfavorable event of receiving the visit of only one buyer, 
despite greater inflation and a low effective bargaining power. Note that while the pairwise 
~We assume n very large and use properties of the urn-ball matching function in the limit in which only the 
ratio of buyers to sellers, (J "" ; = 1, matters. Details on the n-by-n game are given in Appendix A.4. 
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• 
• 
o 
: 2 buyers 2 sellers 
: n buyers n sellers 
~p, 
Figure 3: Prices. 
price rises with small increases in inflation, the relationship between average money holdings 
and inflat ion is still negative. 
Third, as can be seen from Figure 3, the model predicts t hat price dispersion decreases 
as inflation rises. Higher inflation reduces average real balances, 8.nd then sellers' ability to 
discriminate on the basis of realized demand. In addition, as noted above, sellers raise the 
pairwise price but reduce the multilateral price. As a result higher inflation means less dispersion 
in prices. While most empirical studies point to price dispersion increasing with inflation, some 
have documented an inverse relationship as in our model. See for instance Re.insdorf (1994). 
5 Conclusion 
Coles and Eeckhout (2003) have shown that if sellers are allowed to post prices contingent on 
realized demand, then there exists a continuum of equilibria in which posting a. fixed price or 
posting an auction both describe equilibrium behavior. This result is often called to support 
the use of price posting with directed search. In this research we ha.ve shown that it is not 
robust to adding costly money holdings for buyers. If trading with money is costly, and it is 
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at least because of inflation, then there exists a unique equilibrium. In this equilibrium sellers 
post a price pair that exploits ex post competition between buyers yet leaves them ex ante 
indifferent between the corresponding money holdings. The key ingredient for uniqueness is the 
endogeneity of the buyer's liquidity constraint at the point of sale. This result should change 
the way we think about directed search: it is not one equilibrium among the continuum of 
equilibria in the contingerit-price posting game. This result also highlights the importance of 
incorporating money in the study of trading mechanisms. 
2\ 
Appendix 
AI. Proof of Lemma l-
Using the linearity of the W function, that is W,ft (m - p) = W.!:i(m) - ¢+IP, rewrite (10) 
as 
(21) 
and (ll ) as 
(22) V'I(",) =" (0, + 1 ~ 8,) [Q - ¢+I";] + (1 - .,) [Q - ¢+IP.] + wtll (,,;). 
When visiting seller 1, buyer 1 strictly prefers hold ing PI to ~ if -WI + .8Vhl(pi) > -~ + 
.BVbl(~) . Plugging (21) and (22) into this inequality, using q,+ l (1 + -r) = 4>, dividing by {3 and 
recalling that i = l-§+r it simplifies into 
(23) 
where the left-hand side is t he marginal cost of holding ~ instead of P1. and the right-hand side 
is the marginal benefit. From (23) buyer 1 's best-response correspondence is given by 
0 if (f, > 2ic/1+1 ~-~ 
1I Cl"l Q-4>+I~ - 1 
(24) ~= (0,1) 'f fY;. _ 2·</1+1 14-14 I , -
"'2 Q-4>+IP2 - 1 
1 if B2 < 2i4>+1 P2-p'\ 
02 Q-41+ I V2 
-1 
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A similar exercise shows that the best-response oorrespondence of buyer 2 is 
0 if (/, > 2;·+1 J4-~ 1 <'I Q-.+IJ4 - 1 
(25) 92= (0, 1) 'f (/, _ 2i6 I P1-pj 1 1 _ . <'I Q-.+IJi; - 1 
1 if 0', < 2i¢+I P2-pj 1 <'! Q-~+IP2 - 1 
Assuming 0'\ E (0, 1) and 0'2 E (0, 1) , then both oorrespondences intersect at (1,0) , (0, 1) 
and dr. E (0,1) and 92 E (0, 1). Clearly (~ , 8'2) = (1, 1) cannot be an equilibrium: if buyer 1 
plays ~ = 1 then buyer 2's best response is to play 02 = 0 and vice versa. The equivalent 
argument holds for (8'1> 02) = (0,0). Since (~, 8'2) = (1,0) or (0,1) correspond to coordinated 
strategies, it follows that if a symmetric equilibrium exists, then buyers randomize over money 
holdings, i.e. dr. E (0,1) and 8'2 E (0, 1). 
Similarly, if visiting seller 2, buyer l's best response is given by 
o 
(26) (0, 1) 
1 
and buyer 2's best response is given by 
o 
(27) (0,1) 
1 
respectively, also intersecting at (1,0), (0, 1) and 81 E (0, 1) and 82 E (0,1). Only the last one 
is a candidate for t he symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium. 
A2 . P roof o f Le m ma 2. 
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For buyer 1, visiting seller 1 can be done holding either Pt or 1'2- The corresponding expected 
payoff is given by 
(28) 0', [-¢p, + flV" (,,;)] + (\ - 0;) [-<1P2 + flV" <1'2)]. 
Recall from Lemma 1 that if a symmetric equilibrium exists then it implies 8', E (0,1) and 
9'2 E (0,1). In this equilibrium buyer 1 randomizes between the two money holdings because 
the expected payoff to holding the low amount or the high amount of money while visiting seller 
1 are equaL For buyer 1 this means that -¢II, + tWb1 (J4) = - ¢P2 + ,BVb1(v!t:) so that (28) is 
simply equal to -WI + ,BV b1 (Pt). Similarly, buyer 1 's expected payment from visiting seller 2 
is simply -¢PI + ,8Vb1 (ptl. Therefore buyer 1 strictly prefers visiting seller 1 to visiting seller 
2 if -WI + pVb1(Pi) > - ¢PI + .8Vbl(Pd· Using the same simplification techniques used in the 
Proof of Lemma 1, this transforms into 
(29) 
Buyer 1 's best response correspondence is then given by 
(30) 
o if (72 > £<t!f3?5;;E:1"::\ 
(71 = . (0, 1) if (72 = ~""71!+i!--:C"':'" 
1 if (72 < """t''S~r;;,:'P''9. 
Similarly, buyer 2'5 best response correspondence is given by 
(3\) (72 = 
o if (71 > ~""71!+i!--:C"':"t 
(0,1) if", ~ i7C':¥"::R!:7iE¥:,\ 
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Botb best-response correspondences intersect at (1,0), (0, 1) and at 0") = 0"2 = 0" given in (12). 
A .3. Proof of Proposition 1 
Using (13) to substitute 1'2 into (17) and then (12) to substitute Vt we obtain 
(32) 
with 
(33) 
Similarly, 
(34) 
with 
(35) 
, [ '] Qa (I + Ii') + 2iKI III(a,Ii';PI)~ 2a( l - a)Ki+a 1 - (9') . ( 9') 
2'+0" 1 + 
Kl = Q (1 - 20") + (i + O")tP+lPl . 
l +i- O" 
II' (a 9· P') ~ 2a (I _ a) K + (I _ a)' (I _ 9') Q (I + 9) (I - a) + 2iK, 
, , 1 , 2i + (1+ 9)(1 a) 
Q (2a - I) + (1 + i-a) . +IPI 
K2 = . . Ha 
Given (P1.P2) we define O"i as the visit strategy by buyers that maximizes seller l's profit, that 
is O"i = arg max III (O",e'iPI). Given (PI,P2) we define e'i as the monetary strategy by buyers 
O"eIO,11 . 
that maximizes seller l 's profit, that is fli = arg max lIt (O",fliPI). Similarly, given (p'1'P2) 
B'eIO,ll 
we denote 0"2 = arg max rr(O",OjVt) and 0; = arg max n2 (0",OjP'a) for seller 2. Seller l 's 
O"E(O,II 8elO,l) 
best-response correspondence is then given by 
(36) 
{ 
~. = arg max TIt (O",8'jPI) 
8'eIO,l) 
O"i = arg max III (O",8'iPl) 
O"E[O,II 
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Similarly, seller 2's best-response correspondence is given by 
(37) 
{ 
8;~",gmaxJJ'(q,8;p!) 
ge [O,I) 
o-i = arg max n2 ((1, 9; Pi) 
a e [O,I) 
To show that there is only one fixed point in the symmetric equilibrium, take the first-order 
condition of n2 with respect to 9 and insert 0- = 1/2. This enables to extract 
(38) 
Then take the first order condition of n2 with respect to 0-, insert ¢rA from (38) and set (J = 1/2 
to ob~ain one equation in one unknown, 9, parameterized by i, of the form 9 (9; i) = O. It is easy 
to show that the function 9 is strictly increasing and that 9 (0; i) < 0 and 9 (1; i) > 0 so that 
there exists a unique e that maximizes seller 2's profit given i, Pi and 14. Finally, inserting Pi 
from (38) into (13) and setting fl = 9 and 0- = 1/ 2 one obtains 
(39) Q( l _ 8') 
To check t hat i E 1 = Ii, tJ simply insert 14 from (39) and Pi from (38) into i= ~i~j~~~ and 
- a(Q-.p+I~) Th' ' Id' i . d r 2i . 
'= . .p+l<i4 pD' IS Yle s 1= I+8 <, an. = m > t. 
A.4. The large economy 
Suppose there is an infinite yet countable number n of buyers and the same number of 
sellers. The value function for a buyer holding PIon the DSM is given by 
(40) 
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where 1/Jp is the probability of a pairwise match fo r a buyer. Not ing 1/Jm the probability of a 
multilateral match in which the buyer wins t he good, the value function of a buyer holding P2 
in the DSM is given by 
In the symmetr ic equilibrium, since buyers use identical visit strategies, the matching tech-
nology corresponds to a standard urn-ball process. The probability fo r a buyer to face n other 
buyers at a seller's shop is then given by Pr[Y = n] = ~e-"Y where Y is the random variable 
equal to how many other buyers show up and 'Y (= 1) is the buyer-seller ratio. The probability 
of a pairwise match for a buyer is then equal to the probability that no other buyer shows uP. 
that is 1/Jp = P rlY = 0] = e-"'. The value of 1/Jm is more demanding. To win the good in a 
multilateral match, the buyer must hold the high amount of money P'l and be selected among all 
the buyers who also brought 1'2. Denoting k the number of buyers who also brought 1'2 among 
the n other buyers present at the sell.er's we have 
(42) 
To understand the terms. inside the curly brackets, consider the case in which the buyer faces 
~ other buyers so that n = 2. The buyer wins t~e good if he is the only one holding 1'2 which 
happens wit h probability fj2, or jf one of the two other buyers holds 1'2, which happens with 
probability (~)8( 1 - 8) in which case he wins the good with probability ~,or if both of them 
hold 1'2, which happens with probability (1 - 8)2 in which case he wins t he good with probability 
!. This probability simplifies into 
1 -"( (1 - 8) e-"Y _ e-"7(i-O) 
,(1 0) 
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The value function for a. buyer on the centra1iz~ market is given by 
(43) 
Inserting (40) into (43), using the same simplification techniques as before and noting ZI = 
¢ +IPI. a buyer's net utility from holding PI is given by 
(44) 
Inserting (41) into (43) and noting Z2 ::;: ¢+lP2, a buyer's net utility from holding P2 is given by 
(45) 
As for sellers, their value function on the DSM is given by 
(46) 
where ~p is the probability of a ~air~ise match for a seller and t", is the probability of a 
multilateral match in which at least one of the buyer holds 1'2. Noting Z the random variable 
equal to how many buyers are present, we have 
(47) 
and 
(48) {m ~ L Pr[Z ~ n]( l - 8") . 
n~2 
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This last probability simplifies into 
(49) 
To compute the value function of a seller on the centralized market, we use a method 
developed by Montgomery (1991) . The key to this method is to assume that sellers must 
provide buyers with a certain level of expected utility U, given by the market, which is later 
determined endogenously. Sellers are then thought of offering a combination of prices and a 
probability to trade that yields U to buyers.1O Suppose a seller chooses a particular (Pl,P2) and 
buyers respond by visit ing him with probability a and holding PI with probability (J, implying 
probabilities to trade equal to ¢"p b) and,pm b). In a competitive economy no seller can beat 
the market by posting a different combination of prices and probabilities. Given that q = q ('Y) 
the seller 's value function in the centralized market is then 
(50) W"'(m) = 4>m + max {lW. 
"P1,Pl,-y,B 
Inserting (46) into (50) and simplifying, the seller's problem is 
(51) 
(52) s.t. - iZI + e-"" (Q - %1) = U, 
(53) s.t. 
1 - 'Y (1 - 0) e-"" _ e-...,(1- 8) 
-iz2+e-'(Q -zI) + ,(1 -8) (Q-z,)=U. 
First use (52) to substitute %1 into (53) and call it (53-bis). Then use (52) to substitute %1 into 
(51), and use (53-bis) to substitute Z2 into (51). We are left with an unconstrained maximization 
problem in 'Y and 0, the solution to which is represented on Figure 2 in red. 
IDOther papers in the literature using this approach are Peters (2000), Peters 9Jld Severinov (1997), Burdett, 
Shi and Wright (2001). 
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